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Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle 
 
 
Daniel A. Crane* 
Given the Internet’s designation as “the Great Equalizer,”1
Fresh on the heels of its initial success in advocating a net “neutrality principle,”
 it is unsurprising that non-
discrimination has emerged as a central aspiration of web governance. But, of course, 
“bias,” “discrimination,” and “neutrality” are among the slipperiest of regulatory 
principles.  One person’s “bias” is another person’s “prioritization.”   
2
Count me a skeptic.  Whatever the merits of the net neutrality argument, a general 
principle of search neutrality would pose a serious threat to the organic growth of Internet 
search.  Although there may be a limited case for antitrust liability on a fact-specific basis 
for acts of “naked exclusion” against rival websites, the case for a more general neutrality 
principle is weak.  Particularly as Internet search transitions from the “ten blue links” 
model of just a few years ago to a model where search increasingly engines take on the 
function of providing end information or interactive interfaces to website information, a 
neutrality principle becomes incoherent. 
 
Google is in the rhetorically uncomfortable position of trying to stave off a corollary 
principle of “search neutrality.”  Search neutrality has not yet coalesced into a generally 
understood principle, but at its heart is some idea that Internet search engines ought not to 
prefer their own content on adjacent websites in search results but should instead employ 
“neutral” search algorithms that determine search result rankings based on some 
“objective” metric of relevance. 
I. FROM TEN BLUE LINKS TO INTEGRATED INFORMATION PLATFORM 
A.  Ten Blue Links 
 
Much of the discourse about search neutrality seems to be predicated on dated 
assumptions.  This is forgivable, since Internet search is evolving at such a rapid pace 
that much information is stale shortly after it hits the ether.  Still, as with any highly 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  I am grateful to various individuals at both Google and 
Microsoft for discussing these issues with me.  All views expressed are solely my own.  Elizabeth Cuneo 
provided excellent research assistance. 
1  See, e.g., The Great Equalizer, Remarks by William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications 
Commission, June 5, 2000, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek014.html. 
2 See Benjamin Edelman, Bias in Search Results?  Diagnosis and Response (on file with author) (reporting 
that “Google’s management and public policy staff have spoken in favor of network neutrality”). 
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 2 
dynamic sector, the alacrity with which state of the art becomes state of the past is a 
reason to favor a mildly Schumpeterian suspicion that antitrust interventions may find it 
hard to keep pace with the market. 
In any event, much of the conversation about a search neutrality principle seems to 
envision the world of search circa, say, 2005.  In this world, the relevant Internet 
consisted of two different segments—websites and search engines.3  Websites were the 
Internet’s information wells, places users went to access content.  Search engines were 
not ultimate information but only ways to access information, or intermediate information 
about ultimate information.  In this way, search engines’ role was clear:  generate a list of 
the “best and most useful websites” so that users could leave the search engine and get 
“to the right place as fast as possible.”4  With the aid of mathematical algorithms, search 
engines would respond to users’ queries by providing “ten blue links,” or ten uniform 
resource locators (or URLs) and a short (fair use doctrine protected) extract for each 
result.  Each link was then rank-ordered according to the search terms users entered.5  
This mechanical “intuition” determined the likelihood that pages would match what the 
user was seeking.6
In this paradigm, original sin entered the world with vertical integration.  Once search 
engine companies began to integrate vertically by operating websites, they were tempted 
to manipulate the previously objective search algorithms to favor their own sites in their 
search results.  Thus, in response to a query suggesting an interest in finding driving 
directions, Google might prioritize a link to Google Maps in its search results at the 
expense of MapQuest.  Given a sufficient dominance in search, Google might then over 
time erode MapQuest’s market position and entrench Google Maps as the dominant 
driving direction site.
 
7
 
3 See generally Rufus Pollack, Is Google the Next Microsoft?  Competition, Welfare and Regulation in 
Internet Search, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265521. 
 
4 David Scheff, Playboy Interview:  Google Guys, PLAYBOY, September 1, 2004 (reprinted in Google Inc., 
Aug. 18, 2004 Form 424B4 (filed Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.14cZu.htm#1stPage). 
 
5 See The Power of Google:  Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?:  Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Eric 
Schmidt, Executive Chairman, Google Inc.). 
6 Id. 
7 Indeed this is the argument advanced by Adam Raff, co-founder of Foundem, an internet technology firm 
that runs a vertical search website in the United Kingdom.  According to Raff, Google’s “preferential 
treatment of Google Maps helped it unseat MapQuest from its position as America’s leading mapping 
service virtually overnight.”  Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, but You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html.  Further, the company’s “domination of 
the global search market and ability to penalize competitors while placing its own services at the top of its 
search results,” created a “virtually unassailable competitive advantage” that, when deployed, “toppled” 
incumbents, “suppressed” new entrants, and “imperiled” innovation.  Id. 
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In a moment, I will suggest that the “ten blue links” vision of Internet search is 
woefully inadequate as an assumption for imposing a search neutrality principle.  But, 
first, let us consider the “ten blue links” paradigm on its own terms. 
From an antitrust perspective, the ten blue links account seems to entail a standard 
problem of monopoly leverage following vertical integration.  Think AT&T in 1975.  
Queue all of the usual arguments.8
Assuming for the sake of the argument that leveraging from a dominant search engine 
to an adjacent website is, in theory, a rational business move if the dominant firm can pull 
it off, one may ask whether this vision has any correlation with reality.  The principle 
sticking point with the story is the assumption that just because a search engine is 
dominant vis-à-vis other search engines it has the power to promote or demote adjacent 
websites to its advantage and in a way that seriously affected the overall competitiveness 
of the adjacent market.  This would only be true if search engines were indispensible 
portals for accessing websites.  They are not.  Users link to websites from many origins—
for example, bookmarks, links on other websites, or links forwarded in e-mails—other 
than search engines.  Even dominant search engines account for a relatively small 
percentage of the traffic origins. 
  Monopoly leverage makes no sense because the 
search engine monopolist would merely cannibalize its own advertising revenues in 
search by raising the price in the adjacent website.  Response:  the one monopoly profit 
argument only holds if the complementary goods are consumed in fixed proportions, 
which search services and sites are not.  Further, advertisers, not consumers, pay directly 
for most search services and website functions, and advertisers do not experience 
websites and search engines as complementary, but rather substitute, outlets.  Counter-
response:  Vertical integration eliminates double marginalization and hence leads to 
lower prices.  And so forth. 
For example, when Google acquired the travel search software company ITA in 2011, 
rivals complained that Google would use its dominance in search to steer consumers to a 
Google travel site instead of rival sites like Expedia.com, traveolocity, or Priceline.com.  
But even if Google did that, it is hard to imagine that this could be fatal to rival travel 
search sites.  According to compete.com data, the volume of traffic into the three big 
travel search sites that originated with a Google search is small—12% for Expedia and 
10% for travelocity and priceline.9
One has to be careful with search origin data of this sort.   It might be that Google 
accounts for the immediate origin in only a small percentage of cases, but accounts for 
the initial search leading to a particular site in a much larger percentage of cases.  For 
  The percentages of Google-originated traffic coming 
into Yahoo! travel and Bing travel (Microsoft’s service) were even smaller—7% and 4% 
respectively. 
 
8 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the 
Question? (Working paper 2011). 
9 PowerPoint Presentation, ITA Intro for Third Parties, provided by Google, on file with author. 
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 4 
example, users may begin with a Google search, link to an intermediate site, and then link 
to the ultimate site.  If there is a high amount of path dependence in search—meaning 
that the search engine a user begins with has a large influence on where they end up, 
regardless of the number of intermediate steps—then the exercise of market power at the 
first search stage could have effects far downstream. 
Still, it is unlikely that search engines are anything approaching essential facilities for 
most websites.  Even studies that attribute a large share of search origin to Google 
generally have Google accounting for significantly less than 50% of website’s traffic.10  
Newer sites may be more reliant on search origins than more established sites,11
Thus, a major flaw in the monopoly leverage story that even if a particular search 
engine were dominant as a search vehicle, search engines are not necessarily dominant 
when it comes to reaching websites.  In most cases, a critical mass of users know where 
they want to go without conducting a search.  Manipulation of a search engine to favor 
particular sites might induce more traffic to come into the site, but it seems unlikely that 
it could foreclose customers from reaching competitive sites. 
 but even 
newer sites have options—such as advertising in other media or purchasing sponsored 
links—that do not require a high search rank to obtain traffic. 
 
B.  Integrated Information Portal 
 
 1.  Changing Patterns of Internet Search 
 
The ten blue links vision of Internet search is outdated.  Increasingly, search engines 
are not merely providing intermediate information but ultimate information, the answers 
themselves.  Or, if the search engine remains a step removed from the ultimate 
information, it is integrated with the ultimate information.12
 
10 See Omar Khan, How Much of an Average Website’s Traffic Comes from Google?, 
www.islco,com/blog/how-much-average-websites-traffic-comes-google. (reporting that search drove 61% 
of all visits to 21 sampled websites and that Google organic search drove an average of 41% of traffic to 
the sampled websites) (visited May 20, 2011); http://blumenthals.com/blog/2011/01/11/how-much-traffic-
do-local-sites-get-from-google/ (reporting that in 2009, 36.9 percent of the total traffic from the studied 
sites came from Google search). 
  Increasingly, it is not 
11 http://www.roi.com.au/beginners-search-engine-marketing/what-of-website-traffic-should-be-generated-
from-search-engines/ (reporting that between 70% and 80% of all web traffic to newly established websites 
from search engines). 
12 An October 2010 study published by comScore, Inc. indicated that one third of all searches performed on 
the Big 3 search engines contained a non-web source like news, videos, or images within their results.  In 
particular, Bing and Google included these “blended results” 54% and 33% of the time, respectively.  ELI 
GOODMAN & ELI FELDBLUM, BLENDED SEARCH AND THE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, 6-8 (comScore 
2010), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/ 
Presentations_Whitepapers/2010/Blended_Search_and_the_New_Rules_of_Engagement. 
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accurate to speak about search engines and websites as distinct spaces or the relationship 
between search and content as vertical.  The lines are blurring at ether speed. 
Driving this progression are users’ own preferences.  As the head of Yahoo Labs and 
Yahoo’s search strategy explained in 2009, “People don’t really want to search.  Their 
objective is to quickly uncover the information they are looking for, not to scroll through 
a list of links to Web pages.”13  Consequently, search engines are no longer just focusing 
on document retrieval.  Instead, they are working towards direct question answering. 14  
By figuring out the “intent” of the person conducting the search and then displaying all 
the related content that he might want to see, search engines are shifting away from the 
paradigmatic ten blue links towards a world of richer results.15
Consider a few examples—examples which may only hold as of the precise date of 
this writing, May 1, 2011.  Go to Google and type “How tall is the Empire State 
Building?”  In the search results, before the display of the now proverbial ten blue links, 
you will find the following nugget:  “Best guess for Empire State Building 
Height is 1,250 Feet.”  This is ultimate information—probably enough to satisfy most 
high school students doing research papers— not a blue link.  To be sure, if you want to 
dig further, the “show sources” button will let you ask for sources and blue links will 
appear.  But for many users, the search engine itself is the end of the road—the answer. 
 
 Now go to Bing and type “new york to rome.”  After an initial sponsored link 
appears a conventional flight universal search box of the type Internet users are 
accustomed to seeing inside the walled garden of an airline website or a traditional travel 
site:  From and to, leave and return with calendar functionality.  A small side panel lists 
price estimates for various departure dates.  We are still within the search engine but 
clearly beyond the world of blue links.  Conventional website functionality appears 
comingled with traditional search functionality.  Type in dates and search again.  Up 
come a list of results—not links—but flight schedules and prices.  Now—as of Bing on 
May 1, 2011—in order to complete the transaction you will have to select a vendor (say 
Orbitz or American Airlines) and here Bing finally does act as a traditional search engine 
and send you on your way to a website that will take ownership over the last leg of the 
transaction.  Google’s acquisition of ITA may push this sort of travel search even further 
into seamless (to the user) integration where the line between search engine and website 
may vanish altogether. 
A final experiment.  Go to Yahoo!  Before you even type in your search query, 
observe that you are treated to news headlines—ultimate information—on the front page.  
Now type “Venice” in the search query bar.  The first search results page is cluttered with 
 
13 James Niccolai, Yahoo Vows Death to the ‘10 Blue Links’, PCWORLD (May 19, 2009, 7:40 pm), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/165214/yahoo_ 
vows_death_to_the_10_blue_links.html. 
14 See Oren Etzioni, Search needs a shake-up, 476 NATURE, 25, 26 (2011). 
15 See Niccolai, supra note 13. 
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 6 
information.  Local time, current weather and forecast, maps, pictures, and, of course, 
sponsored and unsponsored links.  From the search results screen you might find all of 
the information you needed to know about Venice and never click on a blue link. 
This is the evolving world of search.  As a senior vice president of Yahoo! explained 
in 2011, it is time “to re-imagine search. The new landscape for search will likely focus 
on getting the answers the user needs without requiring the user to interact with a page of 
traditional blue links. In fact, there may be cases where there are no blue links on a search 
results page at all.”16
What does it mean to discriminate in favor of one’s own services in world where 
search and services have merged, where the search engine is not merely linking to 
external information but serving up information interfaces and data?  If Google decides to 
provide a map on the search results front page, must it select a “neutral” way of 
determining whether the map will be drawn from Google Maps or from AOL’s Mapquest 
service?  If Microsoft embeds ticket purchasing functionality in Bing, must it make 
interfaces to its competitor’s services available on an equal basis?  If Yahoo answers a 
stock price quotation query by listing current prices and suggesting a means of 
purchasing the stock, must it list the most popular brokerage sites in rank order rather 
than offering to undertake the transaction itself or through one of its partners? 
 
Affirmative answers to these hypothetical questions would freeze the evolution of the 
search engine.  Unless the search engine is to remain stuck in the ten blue links paradigm, 
search engine companies must have the freedom to make strategic choices about the 
design of their services, including the decision to embed proprietary functions 
traditionally performed by websites in the engine’s search properties.  Such freedom is 
inconsistent with an expansive principle of search neutrality, but it is indispensible to 
Internet search innovation.  
The evolution of Internet search is leading to the redefinition of many markets and 
dislocations of many media and technology companies. As Ken Auletta has observed, the 
evolution of search makes Google a “frenemy to most media companies.”17  Be that as it 
may, the search engine’s evolution evidences Schumpeter’s “gales of creative 
destruction”18
 
 which are indispensible to large-scale progress in a market economy. 
 
 
 
 
16 Shashi Seth, A New World of Search is About the Answers, Not Just the Links,  
http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/07/search-answers-not-just-
links/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Techcrunch+%28TechCru
nch%29 (May 7, 2011). 
17 KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED:  THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 254 (2009). 
18  
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  2.  Special Rules for Google? 
 
Despite the fact that all of Internet search is rapidly evolving toward a radical 
redefinition of the search engine and its role in disseminating information, some believe 
that Google—and, of course, the search neutrality discourse is directed against Google—
should have a special obligation to evolve in a nondiscriminatory manner.  The 
arguments for a Google-specific obligation are two.   
First, Google might be subject to special obligations of neutrality and transparency 
because it has long marketed its search engine as a neutral algorithmic platform.19  
Empirical work shows that users place a large degree of trust in Google’s perceived 
neutrality in ranking relevance to queries, often substituting Google’s algorithmic 
judgment of relevance for their own evaluation of search result abstracts.20
This argument seems a rather thin reed.  It surely cannot be the case that Google is 
prohibited to keep pace with the evolution of Internet search just because its customers 
once associated it with the ten blue links model.  Unless Google is practicing deception 
by making knowingly false neutrality claims that induce a substantial number of 
customers to misunderstand the nature of its offerings in a way that materially distorts 
competition, it is hard to see why past expectations should in any way dictate future 
obligations. 
  This perhaps 
differentiates Google from rival search engines, which have not proclaimed their 
objectivity or created neutrality expectations among their users.  Microsoft, for example, 
characterizes Bing not as a search engine but as a “decision engine” which incorporates 
the user’s subjective preferences to render a customized search result.  From the 
beginning, Bing’s functionality has been much closer to that of a web portal than a “ten 
blue links” type search engine. 
 
19 As Senator Herb Kohl recently remarked, “[t]he basic premise of Google at its founding was that it 
would build an unbiased search engine–that consumers would see the most relevant search result first, and 
that the search results would not be influenced by the web page’s commercial relationship with Google.” 
The Power of Google:  Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?:  Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. 
on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Hon. Herb 
Kohl, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights).  Indeed, for its 
2004 IPO Google made clear:  “We will do our best to provide the most relevant and useful search results 
possible, independent of financial incentives.  Our search results will be objective and we will not accept 
payment for inclusion or ranking in them.”  Google Inc., Aug. 18, 2004 Form 424B4 (filed Aug. 19, 2004), 
http://www.secinfo.com/ 
d14D5a.14cZu.htm#1stPage. 
20 Bing Pan, et al, In Google We Trust:  Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J. 
Computer Mediated Communication 801 (2007). 
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 8 
This brings us to the second claim—that Google, and Google alone, should have 
special neutrality obligations because it is so dominant in search.21
II. IS ANTITRUST MADE FOR THIS PROBLEM? 
  Assuming that 
Google is sufficiently dominant to count as a monopolist under U.S. law or dominant 
undertaking under EU law, this is still not a compelling reason to lock Google into a 
neutrality obligation.  Dominant firms may sometimes have special antitrust obligations 
not shared by weaker rivals, but those obligations should never stand in the way of the 
firm’s ability to innovate.  Application of a broad neutrality principle—one that 
prohibited Google from favoring its own adjacent services in responding to customer 
queries—would severely handicap Google in the continuing evolution of Internet search. 
A.  Against a General Principle of Search Neutrality 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that there should be no general principle of search 
neutrality.  At most, the available theory should be limited to a highly fact-specific claim 
that a dominant search engine deliberately overrode its ordinary algorithmic protocols to 
disadvantage a competitive service (or a non-competitive service when instigated by a 
rival of that service) without any reasonably believed efficiency justification in a way that 
created, preserved, or enlarged market power.  Let us consider each of the relevant 
elements separately. 
First, the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving that the demotion was 
deliberate—that the defendant specifically targeted the plaintiff’s service for a 
disadvantage.  Accidental slights to a competitor’s search results ranking—which 
probably occur periodically given the sheer volume of programming parameters—should 
not give rise to antitrust liability. 
Second, the plaintiff should be required to show that the defendant overrode it 
ordinary algorithmic protocols.  In the Foundem case, for example, Google allegedly 
applied a penalty filter that demoted Foundem’s “natural” ranking position.22
 
21 This argument is premised on the notions that “search is the critical gateway by which users navigate the 
web” and that search traffic drives development on the Internet.  As such, Google’s dominance gives the 
company not only “unprecedented power to steer users and to stifle competition,” but to raise prices and 
reduce innovation as well.  The Power of Google:  Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?:  
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 3-4 
(2011) (statement of Thomas O. Barnett, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP). 
  Such 
“whitelising” would meet the second element.  What this requirement would exclude, 
however, is a claim that the search engine algorithm was designed to advantage the 
search engine’s adjacent services or disadvantage particular kinds of competitors.  
Scrutiny of such product design decisions is not a proper antitrust function. 
22 http://www.searchneutrality.org/foundem-google-story 
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Third, antitrust liability should only attach to actions directed against competitors of 
the search engine or actions instigated by rivals of the disadvantaged service.  This 
requirement would essentially track the logic of Robinson-Patman Act jurisprudence 
limiting scrutiny to competitive effects felt at the primary or secondary levels.  It would 
exclude efforts to create an antitrust principle of general fairness to all vertically related 
companies. 
Fourth, no liability would attach if the search engine company reasonably believed 
that its decision was necessary to advance the efficiency of its service.  Two limitations 
on liability are embedded in this formulation of the test.  First, a good faith belief that a 
particular business decision was necessary to advance the functioning of the service 
should suffice to eliminate antitrust liability.  Consistent with business judgment rule 
principles, courts or agencies should defer to decisions the search engine firm could 
reasonably have reached under the circumstances, whether or not the court or agency 
would reach the same decision on the litigation or investigatory record.  Second, courts 
and agencies should not seek to balance the procompetitive effects of the decision against 
its anticompetitive consequences, as some courts and commentators have suggested is a 
necessary step in monopolization analysis.  Such balancing is plagued by difficulties in 
any context, but is particularly inappropriate in the highly dynamic world of Internet 
search where the value of any particular product design decision often cannot be realized 
until it nears obsolescence. 
Finally, as in any antitrust case, liability should only attach to acts that have 
anticompetitive effects—those acts that create, enhance, or preserve market power.  Acts 
of “pure malice” that do not result in distortions of the competitive market belong to the 
world of tort, not of antitrust. 
What this proposed test would leave as potential grounds for search engine liability is 
acts of intentional naked exclusion—selective demotion of rivals’ services without any 
plausible efficiency explanation.  This would be a high bar for any plaintiff to meet, but it 
leaves open to door to liability in the most egregious cases of exclusion. 
 
B.  The Perils of Process 
 
As with most issues of exclusionary conduct in highly dynamic industries, one of the 
chief obstacles to implementation of a search neutrality principle is administrative.  
Given that search engine companies make thousands of complex decisions about the 
ordering of search results, the management of a general search neutrality principle would 
require an army of bureaucrats or a technical committee dwarfing the one mandated by 
the Microsoft consent decree.  The costs of such a program and the potential for abuses 
seem large compared to the potential benefits for competition. 
Further, such a program—if conducted by the government—would raise serious free 
speech concerns.  If we consider the query-and-response format of Internet search a 
conversation between a user and a service provider, then the search engine design would 
9
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 10 
seem to enjoy some degree of constitutional protection.23  This is not to say that any 
imposition of antitrust liability would be ipso facto unconstitutional.24
 
  Rather, it is to 
acknowledge that, at a minimum, a pervasive governmental role in refereeing the ways in 
which answers to questions on the Internet are dispensed would lead to various 
entanglements that democracies prefer to avoid. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Internet search is evolving at breakneck speed.  There is an argument that this is 
precisely the time when antitrust intervention to ensure a competitive playing field is 
most warranted—that once the dust settles and dominant players have locked in their 
positions due to network effects, scale economies, first mover advantages and the other 
usual entry barriers the game will be up.  The counterargument is that high market 
velocity is reason for antitrust regulators and courts to take a seat on the sidelines—to 
wait out the gales of creative destruction and only enter the game once the market settles 
into more sedulous activity and a more predictable path is foreseeable. 
Mandating a broad search neutrality principle would unwisely favor the first 
argument.  It would lock dominant search engines into a dated model of Internet search 
and freeze their evolution, even while their rivals would have a free hand to innovate.  
Such a rule would certainly diminish Google’s dominance—but precisely because it 
would prohibit Google from meeting customers’ needs by offering a more seamless and 
integrated search and transaction experience.  Antitrust law should never seek to destroy 
dominance by prohibiting dominant firms from innovating to keep up with their 
customers’ changing demands. 
While a broad search neutrality principle is neither feasible nor desirable, this does 
not mean that dominant search engines should never be liable for intentionally interfering 
with their rivals’ hits in search results.  Any such liability should be narrow, carefully 
tailored, and predictable.  Search neutrality may thus have future, not as a general 
principle, but as the misfiting tag line on fact-specific findings of egregious abuses by 
dominant search engines. 
 
23 See Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc., 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okl. May 27, 2003) 
(holding that Google’s PageRanks are subjective opinions protected by the First Amendment). 
24 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness, and Accountability 
in the Law of Search, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1149 (2008). 
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